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TO: Robert J. Fenton, Deputy Associate Administrator for the Office of Response 
and Recovery, FEMA 
 
FROM: Peter Danjczek, External Affairs Advisor, Response Directorate, FEMA 
 
DATE: December 1, 2014 
 
RE: Assessing FEMA’s Generator Program 
 
 
I. ACTION FORCING EVENT: 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has made significant 
progress in its ability to “support our citizens and first responders to ensure that as a 
nation we work together to build, sustain, and improve our capability to prepare for, 
protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate all hazards,”1 particularly since the 
shortfalls of Hurricane Katrina and the challenges faced in Hurricane Sandy. However, in 
the FEMA Strategic Plan 2014-2018 released in July 2014, FEMA has challenged itself 
to further advance by “institutionalizing key improvements while building Agency 
capacity and strengthening national capabilities for disaster preparedness.”2 The strategic 
plan includes five strategic priorities: 1. Be survivor-centric in mission and program 
delivery; 2. Become an expeditionary organization; 3. Posture and build capability for 
catastrophic disasters; 4. Enable disaster risk reduction nationally; and 5. Strengthen 
FEMA’s organizational foundation; all of which incorporate FEMA’s two strategic 
1 United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency. About FEMA. August 14, 2014. Accessed 
August 14, 2014. http://www.fema.gov/about-fema.  
2 United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency. FEMA Strategic Plan 2014-2018. July 18, 2014. 





                                                          
imperatives, “A Whole Community3 Approach to Emergency Management” and “Foster 
Innovation and Learning.”4 
As a supporting senior executive to the development of FEMA strategic priorities 
two and three, FEMA’s Region III Administrator met with FEMA’s Deputy 
Administrator and the Deputy Associate Administrator for the Office of Response and 
Recovery (ORR) to discuss concerns that the installation of generators at critical facilities 
in the wake of disasters takes longer than is acceptable, and requested that FEMA 
leadership seek a means for expediting this process. Following the initial discussion, I 
was tasked with identifying potential solutions to this issue. However, while the initial 
direction that I was given asked that I present a proposal for expediting the installation of 
generators at critical facilities, it was determined that a broader scope than the original 
intent of the tasking is required to address the primary issues facing FEMA’s generator 
mission. This memorandum explains the issues with FEMA’s generator mission, provides 
the history and background of the issues, presents the policy and political considerations, 
and recommends a course of action to improve FEMA’s generator mission. 
 
II. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM: 
FEMA must be prepared to provide backup power to critical facilities in disasters, 
especially in catastrophic events that disrupt the energy sector. This is significant to 
acknowledge as Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-21, released in February 2013, 
designates energy and power as “uniquely critical due to the enabling functions they 
3 Whole Community emphasizes that everyone from individual citizens to the federal government, 
including all sectors and jurisdictions, are critical to ensuring that the Nation is prepared for all-hazards. 
4 United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency. FEMA Strategic Plan 2014-2018. July 18, 2014. 
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provide across all critical infrastructure sectors.”5 This issue is amplified by the upward 
trend in the frequency of severe weather which will continue to significantly disrupt the 
Nation’s electric power infrastructure.6  
Recognizing that severe weather will occur more frequently in the future, FEMA 
must ensure the success of its generator mission. FEMA is responsible for fulfilling 
generator requirements by providing the capability, the generators, and the capacity, the 
number of generators, that are anticipated to be required in a disaster. However, after 
analyzing historical data on the number of requested, deployed, and installed generators 
from 2011 to 2014,7 it appears that the issues with FEMA’s generator mission are 
broader than the original intent of this memorandum, to offer courses of action to 
expedite the installation of generators at critical facilities in response to disasters. 
Of the 1,699 generators deployed to disasters between the years 2011 to 2014, the 
average percentage of generators installed has been 12.71 percent, with only 216 of the 
1,699 generators deployed actually having been installed. The 12.71 percent installation 
(utilization) rate indicates that FEMA does not appear to be using accurate data to inform 
its decisions to acquire and deploy generators. This creates an inefficient use of time and 
money, and indicates that FEMA’s generator cache is not based on an accurate estimation 
of anticipated requirements for responding to disasters as FEMA acquires, stores, 
maintains, and deploys generators that are not subsequently installed or utilized. 
5 United States, The White House, Presidential Policy Directive -- Critical Infrastructure Security and 
Resilience, February 12, 2013, accessed February 20, 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-directive-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil.  
6 United States, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Toward More Resilient Futures: Putting 
Foresight Into Practice (Washington, DC, 2013). 
7 Sample size for historical data was conducted by U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and FEMA as briefed at 
the Senior Leadership Summit on May 22, 2014. United States. US Army Corps of Engineers. Senior 
Leaders' Seminar. p. 5, Washington, DC, 2014. 
3 
 
                                                          
Addressing this issue is complex. It is the responsibility of the states to self-
identify critical facilities within their borders and the federal government has no direct 
authority or oversight over the designation of critical facilities. As responsibility for this 
mission is shared by federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) jurisdictions as 
well as by the public, private, and non-profit sectors, addressing this issue will require a 
coordinated effort across the Whole Community. Consequently, any course of action that 




 In the United States, states have autonomy from the federal government in their 
authority to respond to disasters within their respective state borders. Therefore, except in 
the case of a catastrophic incident in which a state government may be so debilitated that 
it can no longer effectively respond on its own, the federal government has no authority 
to assume operational control over the response to a disaster within a state. However, 
when a state’s capacity to respond to a disaster is exhausted, the state may request 
assistance from the federal government, and the President can approve or deny the 
request for assistance through an emergency or disaster declaration, known in short as a 
Presidential declaration.8 When a disaster warrants a Presidential declaration, the federal 
government responds through a coordinated effort led by FEMA. In this section, the 
description of the Disaster Relief Acts and the implementing and corresponding 
Executive Orders and Directives provide a context for understanding that FEMA 
8 States, territories, and federally recognized tribes request federal disaster assistance through the 
declaration process that includes emergency and disaster declarations. 
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possesses a broad spectrum of disaster preparedness and response authorities that can be 
utilized to meet the goal of improving the generator mission in disasters. 
 
The Stafford Act 
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1988 
(Stafford Act) 9 serves as the primary authority for the federal government to respond to 
domestic disasters. As described in the National Incident Support Manual, the Stafford 
Act “authorizes the programs and processes by which the federal government provides 
disaster and emergency assistance to SLTT governments, eligible private nonprofit 
organizations, and individuals affected by a declared major disaster or emergency… 
[and] covers all hazards, including natural disasters and terrorist events.”10 The Stafford 
Act also provides “an orderly and continuing means of assistance by the federal 
government to state and local governments in carrying out their responsibilities to 
alleviate the suffering and damage which result from such disasters.”11  
Further, the Stafford Act provides the President with the authority to “…direct 
any federal agency… to utilize its authorities and the resources granted to it under federal 
law (including personnel, equipment, supplies, facilities, and managerial, technical, and 
advisory services) in support of state and local assistance response and recovery efforts, 
including precautionary evacuations; [and] coordinate all disaster relief assistance 
9 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-288 (as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 5121-5207). 
10 United States, Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Incident Support Manual, p.133, 
February  2011, accessed February 20, 2014, http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1821-
25045-8641/fema_national_incident_support_manual_03_23_2011.pdf.  
11 42 U.S.C. § 5121(b).  
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(including voluntary assistance) provided by federal agencies, private organizations, and 
State and local governments.”12 
Following the passage of the Stafford Act, President Reagan issued EO 12656: 
Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities, which assigns national security 
emergency preparedness responsibilities to federal agencies. This EO defines a national 
security emergency as “any occurrence, including natural disaster, military attack, 
technological emergency, or other emergency, that seriously degrades or seriously 
threatens the national security of the United States.”13 
 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created by the Homeland 
Security Act (HSA)14 in 2002, which consolidated various agencies, including FEMA, 
into one department. The HSA states that the mission of DHS is in part to “minimize the 
damage, and assist in the recovery, from terrorist attacks that do occur within the United 
States; [and to] carry out all functions of entities transferred to the Department, including 
by acting as a focal point regarding natural and manmade crises and emergency 
planning.”15 While the responsibility for the overall coordination of natural and manmade 
disasters and emergency planning was originally given to FEMA, the responsibility was 
transferred to DHS by EO 13286 in 2003 following the passage of the HSA, but was 
delegated back to FEMA in 2010 by DHS Delegation 9001.1. 
 
12 42 U.S.C. § 5170(a)(1) – (2). 
13 EO 12656 Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities, 43 FR 47491, November, 18, 1988. 
14 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296 (codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. §§ 101-1405). 
15 6 U.S.C. § 111 (b)(1)(A). 
6 
 
                                                          
Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 
The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (PKEMRA) 16 was signed 
into law in 2006 to address the weaknesses experienced in the response to Hurricane 
Katrina. Important to FEMA’s role, PKEMRA “enhanced FEMA’s responsibilities and 
its autonomy within DHS. Per PKEMRA, FEMA is to lead and support the Nation in a 
risk-based, comprehensive emergency management system of preparedness, protection, 
response, recovery, and mitigation. Under the Act, FEMA is made  a distinct entity 
within DHS, and the Secretary of Homeland Security can no longer substantially or 
significantly reduce the authorities, responsibilities, or functions of FEMA—or the 
capability to perform them.”17 
 
Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-8 
In 2011, President Obama issued PPD-8: National Preparedness to improve the 
federal government’s system for responding to disasters, placing an emphasis on the 
inclusion of the Whole Community. This changed the way the federal government 
prepares for and responds to disasters by requiring that its efforts incorporate every level 
of government and all sectors, as well as all individuals, “in a systematic effort to keep 
the nation safe from harm and resilient when struck by hazards, such as natural disasters, 
acts of terrorism and pandemics… [and] calls on federal departments and agencies to 
work with the Whole Community to develop a national preparedness goal and a series of 
16 Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (PKEMRA) of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-295. 
17 United States, Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Incident Support Manual, p.133. 
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frameworks and plans related to reaching the goal… [b]ecause when it comes to national 
preparedness, every sector and individual has a role to play.”18 
An important element of PPD-8 is the National Planning Frameworks, under 
which the National Response Framework (NRF) was created. The National Planning 
Frameworks define how the Nation works together “to best meet the needs of individuals, 
families, communities, and states in their ongoing efforts to prevent, protect, mitigate, 
respond to and recover from any disaster event.”19 The second edition of the NRF was 
released in 2013 to emphasize the integration of the Whole Community by “describe[ing] 
the important roles of individuals, families and households in response activities” 20 and 
to stress the importance of the coordinating roles of the 14 Emergency Support Functions 
(ESFs). 
The ESFs are comprised of departments and agencies with particular authorities, 
resources, capabilities, and expertise to coordinate sector specific disaster response 
actions. Each ESF is assigned primary and coordinating agencies that lead the ESF, and 
also designates various support agencies. The primary and coordinating agencies are 
responsible for the coordination of all tasks listed in their specific ESF annexes.21 
18 United States, Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Response Framework, February 3, 
2014, accessed April 28, 2014, http://www.fema.gov/national-response-framework. 
19 United States, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Learn about Presidential Policy Directive-8, 
February 21, 2014, accessed April 28, 2014, https://www.fema.gov/learn-about-presidential-policy-
directive-8. 
20 United States, Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Response Framework, February 3, 
2014. 
21 United States, Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Preparedness Resource Library, 
February 21, 2014, accessed May 01, 2014, http://www.fema.gov/national-preparedness-resource-library. 
The 14 ESFs include The 14 ESFs include: ESF #1 – Transportation, ESF #2 – Communications, ESF #3 - 
Public Works and Engineering, ESF #4 – Firefighting, ESF #5 - Information and Planning, ESF #6 - Mass 
Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services, ESF #7 – Logistics, ESF #8 - 
Public Health and Medical Services, ESF #9 - Search and Rescue, ESF #10 - Oil and Hazardous 
Materials, ESF #11 - Agriculture and Natural Resources, ESF #12 – Energy, ESF #13 - Public Safety and 
Security, and ESF #15 - External Affairs. ESF #14 was removed from the NRF and is now found in the 
National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF). 
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ESF #7 – FEMA’s Generator Cache 
 While ESF #7 in responsible for logistics in disasters, the acquisition, storage, 
maintenance, and deployment of FEMA generators are guided by policy under FEMA’s 
Office of Response and Recovery. FEMA has acquired several different types and sizes 
of generators throughout the Agency’s existence. FEMA currently has 1,012 generators 
in its fleet comprised of 103 different generator sizes, “ranging from 1.5KW… to 
1.825MW.”22 The age of these generators range from 5 to 30 years old.”23 Additionally, 
the cache is comprised of generators from “23 different manufacturers.”24  
 
ESF #3 –US Army Corps of Engineers 
 While FEMA is responsible for setting policies that guide the generator mission, 
and the Department of Energy (DOE) coordinates overall energy issues through ESF #12, 
ESF #3, for which the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is the primary and 
coordinating agency, is responsible for the ‘infrastructure systems’ core capability 
including “providing temporary emergency power to critical facilities (e.g., hospitals, 
water treatment plants, shelters, fire/police stations).”25 ESF #3 is also responsible for the 
‘public and private services and resources’ core capability that includes “execut[ing] 
emergency contracting support for infrastructure related to life-saving and life-sustaining 
services to include providing potable water, emergency power, and other emergency 
22 United States. US Army Corps of Engineers. Senior Leaders' Seminar. p. 5, Washington, DC, 2014. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 United States, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Emergency Support Function #3 – Public 
Works and Engineering Annex, May 2013, accessed March 10, 2014, http://www.fema.gov/media-library-
data/20130726-1921-25045-7868/final_esf_3_public_works_and_engineering_20130501_r1.pdf., p.3.  
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commodities and services.”26 Additionally, though coordinated in practice through ESF 
#3, the ESF #12 Annex also states that USACE is responsible for “power system 
stabilization and reestablishment activities to establish priorities for emergency generator 
installation” as well as “assisting in reestablishing the energy infrastructure.”27 These 
responsibilities designated in the ESF #3 and ESF #12 annexes articulate USACE’s 
responsibility for leading the short-term power restoration mission, including the 
identification and assessment of generator requirements for critical facilities. 
 
Emergency Power Facility Assessment Tool 
 USACE created the Emergency Power Facility Assessment Tool (EPFAT) 
program to improve the short-term power mission by seeking to collect generator 
requirements for critical facilities prior to a disaster created requirement for backup 
power. USACE describes EPFAT as a “secure web-based tool that can be used by critical 
public facility owners/operators, or emergency response agencies, to input, store, update 
and/or view temporary emergency power assessment data. Having pre-installation 
assessment data in advance will expedite USACE’s abilities to provide temporary 
power.”28 
Without pre-installation assessment data, “it can take the USACE many hours and 
possibly days to deploy assessment teams to all of the impacted critical public facilities 
26 United States, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Emergency Support Function #3 – Public 
Works and Engineering Annex, May 2013, p.4. 
27 United States, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Emergency Support Function #12 – Energy 
Annex, May 2013, accessed March 10, 2014, http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1921-
25045-2193/final_esf_12_energy_20130501_r1.pdf , p.6. 
28 United States, Army Corps of Engineers, Emergency Power Facility Assessment Tool (EPFAT), May 30, 






                                                          
so that the right generators can be properly installed… [and] by adding information to 
EPFAT prior to a disaster, USACE will have the assessment data and generator size 
requirements needed to expedite the installation process.”29 Further, “the database also 
provides the facility manager and the local/state/federal emergency management staff a 
permanent off-site repository for this information which is password protected and under 
controlled access.”30 Figure 1 lists the 12 categories that are used to classify types of 
critical facilities that are included in the EPFAT program. 
 
 





29 United States, Army Corps of Engineers, Emergency Power Facility Assessment Tool (EPFAT), May 30, 
2012. 
30 Ibid. 
31 United States, Army Corps of Engineers, Emergency Power Facility Assessment Tool (EPFAT) 
Presentation, by Dave Bishop (Washington, DC, 2013), 16. 
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IV. BACKGROUND 
Despite USACE’s efforts in beginning to collect better data on generator 
requirements, FEMA continues to acquire, store, maintain, deploy, and install generators 
without an accurate understanding or realistic estimation of the type and number of 
generators that may be required to power critical facilities in response to disasters. While 
there is no evidence that the generator mission is ineffective, it has been made apparent 
that the generator mission does suffer from a lack of efficiency. This inefficiency is due 
to the number and type of generators stored and maintained at FEMA’s distribution 
centers not matching or fulfilling any specific requirement, and therefore the number of 
generators deployed in response to disasters has been drastically greater than the number 
of generators actually installed to power critical facilities. 
 
Deficiency in Data 
As there is a lack of data on estimated critical facility requirements for generators, 
FEMA deploys generator packages that are over-encompassing to attempt to prepare for 
any requirements that may arise following a disaster. These packages consist of 
approximately 54 “15KW to 800KW” generators for disasters that occur in the 
continental United States (CONUS) and 85 “11.5KW to 800KW” for disasters that occur 
outside of the continental United States (OCONUS).32 However, of the 1,699 generators 
deployed since 2011 as part of these power packs, only 216 generators have actually been 
installed to power critical facilities. In other words, only 12.71 percent of generators 
deployed have been used in disasters. Further, in 2013, 0 percent of the 267 generators 
32 United States. US Army Corps of Engineers. Senior Leaders' Seminar. p. 5, Washington, DC, 2014. 
12 
 
                                                          
deployed were actually needed to fulfill requirements attributable to a disaster.33 Despite 
these numbers, the low utilization rate of generators in previous disasters cannot be 
assumed to mean that FEMA should necessarily reduce its generator cache without 
further analysis as FEMA is responsible for leading the federal government’s efforts to 
mitigate, prepare for, protect against, respond to, and recover from catastrophic disasters 
that exceed the capability of SLTT jurisdictions. 
This section explains the criticality of power in disasters, describes the anticipated 
increase in frequency of severe weather, calls attention to the aging infrastructure in the 
United States, underscores the Nation’s power outage issues relative to the international 
industrialized community, and stresses that the sum of these factors ultimately contributes 
to a shift from a centralized approach to providing resources and capabilities to a diffused 
model in which the federal government encourages the Whole Community to better 
prepare for disasters. 
 
Criticality of Power in Disasters 
 As mentioned above, energy issues are “uniquely critical due to the enabling 
functions they provide across all critical infrastructure sectors.”34 Energy issues have 
cascading impacts on all other sectors, consequently creating issues that require 
additional disaster response action to resolve. The ability to address energy issues in the 
earliest phases of a disaster response, such as by providing generators to critical facilities, 
can significantly reduce the list of competing issues that the government would otherwise 
33 United States. US Army Corps of Engineers. Senior Leaders' Seminar. p. 5, Washington, DC, 2014. 
34 United States, The White House, Presidential Policy Directive -- Critical Infrastructure Security and 
Resilience, February 12, 2013. 
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need to deconflict and resolve. This enables FEMA to better prioritize required actions in 
a disaster response to best serve the impacted populations. 
 An example of the cascading impact of disruptions in power is described the U.S. 
Department of Energy’s U.S. Energy Sector Vulnerabilities to Climate Change and 
Extreme Weather: 
“Electric power outages affecting gas station pumps in the aftermath of 
Hurricane Sandy limited gasoline available to customers. Similar impacts 
occurred in association with electricity supply and the operations of oil 
and gas refineries and pipeline distribution. Thus, disruptions of services 
in one energy sector (electricity supply, transmission, and distribution) 
may result in disruptions in one or more other sectors (petroleum 
production and distribution), potentially leading to cascading system 
failures. In addition to interdependencies across energy sector 
components, the issue of interdependency is also relevant between the 
energy sector and other sectors... [f]or example, water pumping, transport, 
treatment, and conditioning require energy.”35  
 
 Given the interdependencies with other sectors and the cascading impacts caused 
by energy issues, ensuring power for critical facilities in the aftermath of disasters should 
be a leading priority in future disaster response operations, particularly as the frequency 
of severe weather is expected to increase into the future, as described in the next 
paragraph. Further examples of infrastructure interdependencies with the energy sector 
can be seen in Figure 2 below.  
 
35 United States, Department of Energy, U.S. Energy Sector Vulnerabilities to Climate Change and Extreme 
Weather, (Washington, DC, 2013), p.5. 
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Figure 2: Energy Sector Interdependencies. Source: United States Department of 
Energy36 
 
Increased Frequency in Severe Weather 
 The occurrence of severe weather is becoming increasingly frequent and many 
experts agree that severe weather will continue to be a regular occurrence in the future.37 
As a result of this increase and the state of the Nation’s aging energy infrastructure, 
“buildings have become increasingly susceptible to brownouts, power surges, and rolling 
blackouts.”38 According to FEMA’s Strategic Foresight Initiative (SFI), which analyzes 
the anticipated impacts and consequences of changes in climate and severe weather on 
future disaster response requirements, “the frequency of extreme weather is accelerating, 
with events like Hurricane Sandy threatening to become the norm… [while] fiscal 
pressure and political gridlock has resulted in piece-meal action to mitigate future risks 
36 United States, Department of Energy, Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability Infrastructure 
Security and Energy Restoration, National Response Framework and National Infrastructure Protection 
Plan Presentation, by Anthony Lucas (Washington, DC, 2012), 29. 
37 Young, Jr., William R. 2009. “Emergency Power for Critical Items.” AIP Conference Proceedings 1157, 
no. 1: 201-206. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed February 10, 2014). 
38 Morton, Jennie. “Gear Up for Grid Failure.” Buildings 107, no. 12 (December 2013): 40, p. 41. 
MasterFILE Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed February 10, 2014). 
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and adapt to the growing dangers. Meanwhile, critical infrastructure is undermined by 
extreme weather and overburdened by increased use.”39 This has caused the “annual 
frequency of billion-dollar weather and climate-related events and the annual aggregate 
loss from these events [to] increase during the last 30 years… affect[ing] many 
sectors.”40 These costs are expected to rise as “the growing consensus is that current 
harsh weather conditions will likely worsen, and that warming and sea-level rise 
estimates are conservative.”41 
 The SFI places particular emphasis on the need to prepare for increased energy 
disruptions as “the U.S. power grid may be the most fragile” of all critical sector 
components.42 Further, a report released by the White House Council of Economic 
Advisers and the Department of Energy’s Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy 
Reliability presents that “thunderstorms, hurricanes, and blizzards were responsible for 
679 widespread outages in the last decade, 87% of which affected 50,000 or more 
customers” costing billions annually.43 In fact, there have been “144 weather disasters 
costing $1 billion or more since 1980… 11 [of which] occurred in 2012… the second 
highest cluster behind 2011 for any year on record.” 44 Furthermore, seven of the ten most 
expensive storms in terms of the cost of damages have occurred between 2004 and 
2012.45 
 
39 United States, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Toward More Resilient Futures: Putting 
Foresight Into Practice (Washington, DC, 2013), p.9. 
40 United States, Department of Energy, U.S. Energy Sector Vulnerabilities to Climate Change and Extreme 
Weather, 29. 
41 United States, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Toward More Resilient Futures: Putting 
Foresight into Practice, p.10. 
42 Ibid, p.9. 





                                                          
U.S. Power Outage Compared to the International Community 
 While changes in climate and severe weather patterns have global consequences, 
the impacts in the United States appear to be more significant than in other industrialized 
countries due to the state of the Nation’s aging energy infrastructure. As a result of this, 
the United States is “far below other industrialized countries” in terms of power 
reliability as “the average blackout time is 90% lower in Denmark and 86% less in the 
Netherlands. Though Spain has the second poorest performance behind the US for 
duration [of power outages], its outages are still 56% shorter” than in the United States.46 
 
FEMA Recognizes the Need to Prioritize Energy in Response 
As the Agency responsible for leading the Nation’s consequence management 
efforts, FEMA recognizes that the increased frequency of power outages will continue to 
impact other sectors, especially following events that have occurred in the last decade. 
For instance, in 2003 “over 40 million people in the US and about 10 million people in 
Canada experienced a sudden, unexpected utility power outage… This resulted in the loss 
of water pressure to over four million customers in Detroit alone for four days… [and] all 
the trains running into and out of New York City were shut down.” 47 Two years later, 
Hurricane Katrina left more than three million people without power, and “only about a 
third of the damaged structures had power restored some six months later.”48 Most 
recently, in 2012, Hurricane Sandy caused billions of dollars in damages and left more 
than 8.5 million customers without power in one of the Nation’s most populated 
46 Morton, Jennie. “Gear Up for Grid Failure.” p.42. 
47 Young, Jr., William R. “Emergency Power for Critical Items.” p.201-202. 
48 Ibid, p.202. 
17 
 
                                                          
regions.49 As the SFI anticipates that severe weather incidents such as Hurricane Sandy 
will occur more frequently, FEMA must continue to work with stakeholders throughout 
the Whole Community to better prepare for future disasters and emphasize the Nation’s 
need to prioritize addressing energy issues. 
 
Key Stakeholders 
 Addressing efficiency issues in FEMA’s generator program requires an approach 
that includes stakeholders from the Whole Community. The most significant stakeholders 
to be considered when seeking to resolve strategic and policy issues with the generator 
mission include: the Administrator of FEMA, the FEMA Region III Administrator, the 
USACE Director of Contingency Operations and Homeland Security, state and local 
emergency management officials, and critical facility owners and operators. Members of 
Congress and White House leadership may also have interest in short-term power outage 
issues but they are not principal actors for the purposes of this memorandum. 
 
FEMA Administrator 
 The Administrator of FEMA possesses statutory and delegated authorities to lead 
the federal government’s emergency management efforts. The FEMA Administrator has 
a motto for how he believes the federal government should respond to disasters, ‘Go Big, 
Go Early, Go Fast, Be Smart.’50 Through this, the Administrator aims to ensure that 
communities impacted by disasters will receive the resources and capabilities needed to 
effectively fulfill their disaster response requirements, wants those resources and 
49 Morton, Jennie. “Gear Up for Grid Failure.” p.41. 
50United States, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2012 State of FEMA: Leaning Forward, January 
1, 2012, accessed December 1, 2014, http://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/state_of_fema/state_of_fema.pdf.  
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capabilities delivered as quickly as possible, and simultaneously wants the resources 
delivered efficiently. These principles are applied throughout the 2014-2018 FEMA 
Strategic Plan. 
 
FEMA Region III Administrator 
 The Administrator of FEMA Region III initiated the review of the generator 
mission in meeting with FEMA’s then Associate Administrator for the Office of 
Response and Recovery, who has since been confirmed as the Deputy Administrator of 
FEMA. As the FEMA Region III Administrator is recognized as a leading voice among 
the FEMA Regional Administrators, it is anticipated that the way forward on this 
initiative is more likely to be accepted by the FEMA regions if the FEMA Region III 
Administrator is provided an opportunity to inform the way forward. 
 
USACE Director of Contingency Operations and Homeland Security 
 The USACE Director of Contingency Operations and Homeland Security leads 
ESF #3. The Director has a close working relationship with FEMA leadership, and is 
recognized as one of the most operationally experienced and respected leaders in the 
Emergency Support Function Leadership Group (ESFLG).51 The Director has confirmed 
that USACE would welcome FEMA’s support and endorsement of their ongoing efforts 
to improve the generator mission at the USACE Senior Leaders Seminar (SLS).52 
 
 
51 The ESFLG is the authoritative coordinating body for ESF lead, coordinating, and supporting agencies. 
52 United States. US Army Corps of Engineers. Senior Leaders' Seminar. Washington, DC, 2014. 
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State and Local Emergency Management Officials 
 There is general agreement among the states that disaster preparedness and 
community resilience are important priorities. Many states have actively engaged with 
FEMA requesting support in identifying critical facilities and have asked for guidance on 
conducting assessments of generator requirements for those critical facilities. While state 
governments have the ultimate authority to request a Presidential declaration for support 
in responding to disasters, the county level emergency management officials generally 
have more visibility and a closer working relationship with the owners and operators of 
critical facilities due to the nature of local governments interacting within their localities. 
As a result, any proposal that pertains to critical facilities is expected to find more success 
if the local emergency agencies are involved. 
 
Critical Facility Owners and Operators 
 Critical facilities provide critical services to their community. As many critical 
facilities are owned by local governments or provide public services on behalf of the 
government, critical facility owners and operators are responsible for serving the needs of 
their communities. Therefore, it is in their best interest to ensure that their facilities 
remain operational when their communities are impacted by disasters. 
 
Congress and the White House Office of Management and Budget 
 The four Congressional committees that have most influence on FEMA are the 
House and Senate Appropriations Committees, the House Homeland Security 
Committee’s Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and 
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Communications, and the Senate Homeland and Governmental Affairs Committee’s 
Subcommittee on Emergency Management, Intergovernmental Relations, and the District 
of Columbia. These committees are FEMA’s respective main appropriating and 
authorizing committees. However, FEMA does not require new authorizations or 
additional appropriations to accomplish the recommendations presented in this 
memorandum, as addressed below. However, any future requests for funding changes to 
the program will require the approval of the Appropriations Committees and the White 
House Office of Management and Budget (OMB). 
 
V. POLICY PROPOSAL 
 While the original intent of this memorandum was to provide a recommended 
course of action for expediting the installation of generators at critical facilities in the 
wake of a disaster, the evaluation of the generator mission in its entirety has shown that 
the primary issue is in fact a lack of data collected and analysis performed to drive better 
informed decisions in the acquisition, storage, maintenance, and deployment of 
generators. To address this, it is proposed that FEMA perform a comprehensive 
evaluation of the generator mission. This would be the first comprehensive study on the 
subject and would provide the data necessary for future action, such as potential 
legislation to expand the program, grants to enable critical facility owners and operators 
to purchase their own permanent generators, or possibly the decision to privatize or 
contract out the generator mission. To significantly increase the collection of data needed 
to identify the generator requirements for critical facilities, it is also proposed that FEMA 





 As discussed above, FEMA is authorized to manage its generator program and 
evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of the program through coordination with the 
interagency during steady-state operations. While the Stafford Act and PKEMRA provide 
the authorities found in statute, PPD-8, the NRF, and the ESF construct enable FEMA to 
collaborate with state and local emergency management officials, as well as with USACE 
through ESF #3, to meet the goals of this proposal. 
 
Policy Implementation 
  This proposal incorporates two actions – a comprehensive study by FEMA to 
evaluate and determine the requirements for the generator mission, and an information 
campaign to promote EPFAT, the existing fully funded tool for identifying generator 
requirements for critical facilities. As the latter can be leveraged to provide information 
needed to evaluate the requirements of FEMA’s generator mission, the communication 
campaign should begin immediately and be carried out concurrently while the generator 
mission study is being conducted. These initiatives should be led and coordinated by the 
recently created FEMA/USACE generator working group established on May 27, 2014.53  
 
Program Evaluation 
 The comprehensive study on the generator mission should include the 
identification of authorities and strategic guidance; the assessment of current capabilities 
(type and size of generators) and lifecycle costs; the capacity needed (number of each 
53  United States. US Army Corps of Engineers. Senior Leaders' Seminar. p.5, Washington, DC, 2014. 
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type and size of generator); a detailed analysis of historical usage, including the number 
of generators requested, deployed, and installed over a longer period of time than has 
been assessed to date; and the identification of future risks to the energy sector specific to 
power and the cascading impacts of those risks on other critical infrastructure sectors. 
Additionally, leadership will need to determine the acceptable level or threshold of risk 
that the government is willing to accept. This study should be conducted by the Office of 
Response and Recovery’s Logistics Management Division, informed by the Generator 
Working Group, and validated by FEMA's Enterprise Resource Planning Division within 
the Office of Policy and Program Analysis, which was established to “lead the Agency-
wide effort to translate strategic guidance into achievable, credible, affordable packages 
of capabilities to build into the out year budgets and successfully defend through the 
multiple Federal resource allocation processes.”54  
The final report on the findings can then inform leadership decisions on the future 
direction of the generator program to better match the capability and capacity of the 
program to realistic requirements. To increase the likelihood that the appropriate level of 
attention will be drawn to the report and therefore will be considered by the key 
stakeholders identified above, the report release date should coincide with the first day of 
next hurricane season, June 1, 2015. Following the report’s release, the findings can be 
briefed, as appropriate, at the multiple ‘Hurricane Season Outlook’ briefings that occur 
annually in June in which various stakeholders participate, including Congress, the White 
54 United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency. FEMA Rotation Program Opportunity- 







                                                          
House, interagency partners, and state and local emergency management officials. This 
can assist with educating stakeholders prior to any potential resource requests that the 
findings of the report may require, and therefore can generate stakeholder support prior to 
submitting such requests. 
 
Communication Campaign 
In order to ascertain the tangible requirements of the generator program, FEMA 
and USACE must analyze data on the types and sizes of generators required to supply 
backup power to individual critical facilities across the Nation. While USACE recently 
created the EPFAT tool to allow the owners and operators of critical facilities to share 
their generator requirements with FEMA and USACE, since its inception, EPFAT has not 
collected enough data to inform decisions on which generators are likely to be required in 
a disaster. This is due in part to the fact that the EPFAT tool has been recently developed, 
but is also due to USACE not having formulated an outreach strategy to promote the 
program to SLTT leaders and the emergency management community. While USACE 
manages the EPFAT tool, FEMA can partner with USACE to leverage the strong 
relationships that FEMA has cultivated with the SLTT emergency management 
community to encourage the owners and operators of critical facilities to share their 
requirements through EPFAT. 
Through this partnership, FEMA and USACE can pursue a communication 
campaign, defined as a “preplanned set of communication activities designed by 
government officials to reach and motivate a relatively large number of targets to effect 
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some cognitive, attitudinal, or behavioral objectives.”55 FEMA can work with USACE to 
conduct this communication campaign targeted at state and local emergency management 
officials to promote the EPFAT program through FEMA’s regional construct.56 This 
outreach will include utilizing the press releases, bulletins, and trade magazines that 
FEMA’s Office of External Affairs regularly contributes to, and through prioritizing the 
promotion of EPFAT in the regularly occurring meetings that each FEMA region has 
with their respective SLTT government leadership, emergency management community, 
and private and non-profit sector partners. 
 
VI. POLICY ANALYSIS  
The courses of action proposed above address FEMA leadership’s desire to 
increase the efficiency of the Agency’s generator program. The proposed actions meet 
leadership’s expectations for improvement in this mission space and the proposal can be 
implemented immediately. The ability to produce a comprehensive report on the 
generator program will enable FEMA leadership to make better informed decisions 
regarding the Agency’s process of acquiring, storing, maintaining, deploying, and 
installing generators, allowing for a more efficient program in terms of both time and 
money. Additionally, by conducting a public outreach campaign with USACE for the 
EPFAT, FEMA, with the help of state and local emergency managers, can encourage the 
owners and operators of critical facilities to share their generator requirements. The 
collection of generator requirements for critical facilities can help provide better data for 
55 Marie-Louise Bemelmans-Videc, Ray C. Rist, and Evert Vedung, Carrots, Sticks, and Sermons: Policy 
Instruments and Their Evaluation (New Brunswick, NJ, U.S.A.: Transaction Publishers, 2003), p.105. 
56 FEMA divides the United States and its territories into ten regions, with each being led by a Regional 
Administrator who is a member of the Senior Executive Service. 
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the comprehensive report and can be used to expedite the installation of generators at 
critical facilities following disasters that disrupt power. 
 
Strengths: 
No Changes in Authorization or Additional Appropriations Required 
 Recognizing that “one of the first questions asked by government policymakers 
regarding any proposal (particularly in the context of with today’s high budget deficits), 
is will it cost anything and if so, how much?,”57 a strength of this proposal is that it 
addresses the concerns of FEMA leadership by utilizing existing authorities and 
mechanisms to gain efficiencies in the generator mission without requiring changes in 
authorization or additional appropriations. FEMA can utilize existing initiatives and 
internal program staff to gain efficiencies in the delivery of the generator mission without 
requiring additional authorities or funding through the proposed courses of action. 
 
Identification of Program Requirements for Leadership 
 The purpose of the proposed comprehensive report and associated information 
campaign is to close an information gap between the government and the owners and 
operators of critical facilities. The proposed analysis and its accompanying report would 
identify the requirements for the generator mission based on law and strategic direction 
as well as on FEMA’s catastrophic planning scenario, taking into account historical data 
57 Paul Weinstein, Jr., “Expanding Opportunities for Informed Participation in Public Policy,” Occasional 





                                                          
and future risk assessments, and would be the first definitive study on the generator 
mission. 
By defining the mission requirements more accurately, FEMA can better 
determine the type and number of generators needed by critical facilities in potential 
disaster scenarios, which will approximate the type and number of generators to be 
acquired and maintained. This will also provide a better informed process for the 
deployment of generators so that time and money will not be wasted in deploying a large 
number of generators to disasters that have historically had a low utilization, or 
installation, rate. This would provide direction for a way forward, including adjustments 
to the program, or the possibility for the need for additional legislation, regulations, or 
incentive-based approaches to ensure that critical facilities are powered in the wake of 
disasters. Without this comprehensive study, a policy solution addressing the root causes 
for the inefficiencies in the generator program is not likely to be found.  
 
OMB Approved Methodology 
The analysis for the proposed report is expected to provide context for both 
FEMA leadership, who manage the program, and OMB, which ultimately approves 
FEMA’s budget, on the Executive side, and consequently would decide whether to 
approve any adjustments in program funding. As OMB recently approved a $2.5 million 
request to purchase another FEMA owned commodity, meals for disaster survivors, 
contingent upon the completion of a report that uses the same methodology 
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recommended for the analysis on the generator mission,58 it is expected that the findings 
of the report will provide a sound justification to OMB for any funding requests that may 
be recommended based on the findings of the report. 
 
Existing Systems 
Given the expected future increase in severe weather and consequently the 
increased vulnerability of the power grid, as explained earlier in this memorandum, the 
SFI argues that “integrating and further institutionalizing catastrophic planning 
efforts…across the Whole Community can be a great starting point”59 for preparing for 
the potential effects of climate change. Acknowledging this, FEMA can improve the 
generator mission by coordinating the federal government’s preparedness and response 
efforts using its professional network to increase participation in the EPFAT reporting 
system among critical facility owners and operators. FEMA can leverage the 
relationships it has established with state and local emergency management executives, 
who look to FEMA for emergency management guidance, to promote the EPFAT.  
This campaign is expected to urge state and local emergency management 
officials to encourage critical facility owners and operators to participate in the EPFAT 
program by entering their facilities’ generator requirements into EPFAT. This data can be 
used to inform FEMA’s analysis of its generator mission requirements and will enable 
FEMA, USACE, and SLTT governments to expedite the installation of generators at 
critical facilities earlier in a disaster response, as shown in Figure 3 below. 
58 United States, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Commodities Justification to OMB: Risk 
Analysis on Preparedness to Provide Meals to Disaster Survivors Presentation, by Robert J. Fenton. 
(Washington, DC, 2014), p.8. 
59 United States, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Toward More Resilient Futures: Putting 
Foresight into Practice, p.10. 
28 
 
                                                          
 
 
Figure 3: Critical Facility Categories. Source: United States Army Corps of 
Engineers60 
 
Benefits of an Information Campaign 
 The decision to conduct the proposed EPFAT information campaign is beneficial 
for several reasons. First the campaign does not require additional funding because it 
utilizes the existing systems explained above to conduct the outreach. However, if 
funding was needed, “information programs are generally not very costly.”61  
Second, while “there is no single correct approach”62 to conducting an 
information campaign, research suggests that campaigns can be effective particularly 
if it is in the self-interest of the recipient. Participating in the EPFAT serves in the 
interest of critical facility owners and operators as sharing their generator 
requirements through EPFAT can expedite the installation of generators should they 
60 United States, Army Corps of Engineers, Emergency Power Facility Assessment Tool (EPFAT) 
Presentation, by Dave Bishop (Washington, DC, 2013), p.8. 
61 Bemelmans-Videc et al, Carrots, Sticks, and Sermons: Policy Instruments and Their Evaluation, p.125. 
62 Ibid, p.48. 
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need backup power during a Presidentially declared disaster. As “it seems quite 
rational for government to presume that lack of information is the reason why people 
do not show the desired energy conservation behavior,”63 it is reasonable for FEMA 
to assume that critical facility owners and operators are not aware of the EPFAT or 
its benefits. Therefore, by providing critical facility owners and operators with 
information on the EPFAT and its benefits, the campaign can succeed.64 
This is supported by the Paternalistic Theory which “asserts that information is 
particularly appropriate in situations where the government intervenes in order to effect 
the recipients to act in their own not very well-understood interest… [and] the strongest 
case for information-dispensing action can be brought to bear in situations where the 
target individual is unaware that the action lies both in his own and in the 
community's interest.”65 The Theory of Coinciding Interests further “proposes that 
information should be applied when the desired actions are in the private interests of 
the targets as well as in the public interest of the state.”66 As discussed, such is the 
case with the intent of the EPFAT. 
Third, according to the Legitimating Theory, the proposed courses of action can 
legitimate future implementation of the findings of the report, informed in part by the 
data that can be collected by promoting the EPFAT. According to this theory, 
“information programs are launched in the light of other more constraining policy 
instruments.”67 The optimistic variant of the Legitimizing Theory “suggests that decision 
makers sincerely hope that the perceived problem will be solved through ample use of 
63 Bemelmans-Videc et al, Carrots, Sticks, and Sermons: Policy Instruments and Their Evaluation, p.126 
64 Ibid, p.125. 
65 Ibid, p.109. 
66 Ibid, p.107. 
67 Ibid, p.112 
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informative policy instruments and that stronger measures can be avoided… with the 
hope that information will be sufficient.”68 As additional action may be required in the 
future to address the report’s findings, this proposal also serves in the pessimistic variant 
to the Legitimating Theory, which “suggests that information is used for the political 
purpose of paving the road for stronger interventions…. Since information efforts are 
cheap, easy to enact, and most of all based on voluntary participation, they are supposed 
to be easier to accept for the general public. When stronger measures are inaugurated, the 
decision makers may legitimize their actions by arguing that softer measures have already 
been tried to no or little avail… This type of legitimating theory is probably most 
applicable to paternalistic interventions.”69 As the findings of the comprehensive report 
on the generator mission are not predictable outside of mere speculation, the analysis for 
the report and its accompanying information campaign can send the message to FEMA’s 
stakeholders that the Agency is seeking to gain efficiencies in the program and can 
provide context for any changes in the program that result from the findings of the report. 
Fourth, rather than reaching out directly to the owners and operators of the 
numerous critical facilities throughout the Nation, FEMA can utilize the state and local 
emergency management community as “intermediaries to transmit the message.”70 By 
doing this, the owners and operators are more likely to trust the EPFAT and see it as a 
beneficial tool rather than as an overreach by the federal government attempting to 
collect information or the “government ‘preaching’ to citizens.”71 This approach is 
necessary for the campaign to succeed as “to communicate successfully, [the 
68 Bemelmans-Videc et al, Carrots, Sticks, and Sermons: Policy Instruments and Their Evaluation, p.113 
69 Ibid, p.113 
70 Ibid, p.106 
71 Ibid, p.49. 
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government] must influence and engage with protagonists. These are the people who 
will ensure that ideas are carried and circulated through the wider communities.”72 
As critical facility owners and operators regularly interface with state and local 
emergency management officials, they will likely be more inclined to share their 
generator requirements through EPFAT if it is recommended by the state and local 
emergency management officials. 
Lastly, by packaging the proposed comprehensive program review with an 
information campaign, FEMA is more likely to receive better data for the report. This is 
because “public influencing should be seen as complementary to other policies, not as 
a strategy in its own right... Information and influencing campaigns will work best 
when people have a reason to want to know – and government is ideally placed to 
create that reason, through other policy measures”73 such as the EPFAT and its 




The proposal accepts that FEMA should maintain a generator program and seek 
efficiencies in that program to ensure that critical facilities are provided with backup 
generators when Presidentially declared disasters impact power distribution to those 
facilities. However, it can be argued that the generator program may be addressing 
secondary issues that could be lessened by policy adjustments in other areas of the federal 
government, such as policies that can address the causes of climate change or the 
72 Bemelmans-Videc et al, Carrots, Sticks, and Sermons: Policy Instruments and Their Evaluation, p.18. 
73 Ibid, p.45. 
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vulnerabilities in the power grid which contribute to the increased risk for power outage. 
While the report is expected to determine the generator program requirements, the 
proposal lacks the inclusion of proposed alternatives to addressing the problem. 
Additionally, this memorandum states that generators have had a 12 percent utilization 
rate, with some years having had zero generators installed; this may be sufficient data for 
leadership to decide to reduce the generator cache without further analysis. There has also 
never been an incident in which a generator was requested during a Presidentially 
declared disaster that was not provided, which means there are no issues with the 
program in terms of effectiveness. As this is the case, FEMA leadership may choose to 
not modify the program. 
 
Proposal Lack Comparative Alternatives 
A cost-effectiveness analysis, “the search for the most cost-effective approach to 
providing a desired public good,” 74  could contrast alternative means of providing 
generators to recommend the “approach that provides that good most efficiently.”75 
Without the inclusion of a comparative analysis, FEMA would not be enabled to discover 
potentially better alternative solutions to meeting the intent of the generator mission, such 
as establishing standing contracts to lease generators from the private sector during 
disasters which could eliminate costs associated with acquiring, storing, maintaining, and 
hauling generators, and eliminate the need for lifecycle replacement funding. 
Additionally, if the proposal included the consideration of opportunity cost, “the value of 
74 Jonathan Gruber, “Cost-Benefit Analysis,” in Public Finance and Public Policy (New York: Worth, 
2011), p.220 
75 Gruber, “Cost-Benefit Analysis,” p.220. 
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that input in its next best use,”76 the analysis may find that other means of addressing the 
issue are more effective and/or efficient in both time and money, such as investing in 
hardening infrastructure to increase the resiliency of the power grid or providing grants or 
tax incentives so that state and local governments can purchase generators for critical 
facilities, thus eliminating the need for FEMA to own generators.  
 
Guarantee Can Disincentivize Preparedness 
The report may be impractical as “failing to project the impact of any new policy 
concept in real terms is often a death knell for an idea. Too often proposals are 
accompanied by anecdotal evidence, case studies, or input-focused goals rather than real 
projections of possible outcomes.”77 If generators are in fact the solution for ensuring 
power to critical facilities, by FEMA taking action to better enable its ability to provide 
generators to critical facilities following disasters, critical facility owners and operators 
may be less likely to take proactive measures to improve the resiliency of their critical 
facilities. By informing critical facility owners and operators that the government will 
provide backup generators, regardless of whether they provide their generator 
requirements through EPFAT, the owners and operators may be less inclined to purchase 
backup generators themselves or share their generator requirements until a generator is 
needed during a disaster.  
This can have an adverse effect as in the case of a catastrophic event, the 
government may not have enough generators to power all critical facilities and may not 
be able to install the generators it can provide in the time needed. If the program does 
76 Gruber, “Cost-Benefit Analysis,” p.208. 
77 Weinstein, “Expanding Opportunities for Informed Participation in Public Policy,” p.16. 
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disincentivize action, FEMA is not increasing the resilience of critical facilities over time, 
and SLTT governments will remain dependent on the federal government to provide 
sources of backup power. Therefore, any promotion of the generator mission and the 
EPFAT may worsen rather than resolve the issue.  
 
Campaigns Do Not Guarantee Participation 
According to Jonathan Gruber, an expert in the field of complex policy analysis, 
“for a government making decisions about how much of a public good to provide… 
theoretical concepts must be translated into hard numbers.”78 The Negative Theory of 
Universal Compliance argues that “information instruments should not be utilized 
when universal compliance is considered necessary… [But,] if on the other hand, it 
would be sufficient that 5 or 10 or 20 percent of addressees comply, an information 
campaign might be considered.”79 While it may not be necessary to receive data on 
the generator requirements for 100 percent of all critical facilities in the Nation for 
the government to approximate potential requirement into hard numbers, given the 
low utilization rate of deployed generators being roughly 12 percent, a higher 
participation rate than 5 to 20 percent of critical facilities by be required, which an 
information campaign is not guaranteed to achieve and cannot be guaranteed to 
achieve by the June 1, 2015, deadline for the proposed report. Additionally, “it is 
important not to overestimate the power of providing information. Information does not 
necessarily lead to increased awareness, and increased awareness does not necessarily 
78 Gruber, “Cost-Benefit Analysis,” p.206. 
79 Bemelmans-Videc et al, Carrots, Sticks, and Sermons: Policy Instruments and Their Evaluation, p.107. 
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lead to action.”80 This is because “providing information does not necessarily change 
attitudes, and changing attitudes does not necessarily cause a change in behavior.”81  
 
Status Quo May be Sufficient: 
There has never been an incident in which a generator was requested to provide 
backup power to a critical facility but was not provided. With this, and there being no 
outstanding audit recommendations specifically for the generator program, the program 
does not necessarily need to be altered. Rather than expend resources to gain efficiencies 
in the generator program, FEMA can put the time and effort that the proposal would 
require into improving other areas of FEMA that have been identified as lacking 
effectiveness, which in FEMA’s mission can improve the government’s ability to save 
lives, reduce suffering, and protect property. 
 
VII. POLITICAL ANALYSIS 
While the proposed comprehensive report and its accompanying information 
campaign could more accurately identify the generator mission’s program requirements 
and thereby provide the information necessary for leadership to make informed decisions 
on the future direction of the program, “often researchers are disappointed when they 
provide groundbreaking information and/or data to the government but the executive 
branch decides not to act upon… [due to] the failure of researchers to turn their research 
and/or data into real, usable policy.”82 In order to ensure that the proposal is usable, and 
to maximize the likelihood that the proposal will be put into action, it is important for 
80 Bemelmans-Videc et al, Carrots, Sticks, and Sermons: Policy Instruments and Their Evaluation, p.46 
81 Ibid, p.14. 
82 Weinstein, “Expanding Opportunities for Informed Participation in Public Policy,” p.14. 
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leadership to understand the positions of key stakeholders. As identified in the 
background section of this memorandum, the most significant stakeholders concerned 
with the proposed course of action include the FEMA Administrator, the FEMA Region 
III Administrator, the USACE Director of Contingency Operations and Homeland 
Security, state and local emergency management officials, and the owners and operators 
of critical facilities. Additionally, should additional funding be required to implement the 
findings of the report, OMB and the Congressional Appropriations Committees will 
become larger stakeholders. 
It is expected that the FEMA Administrator will support this proposal if the 
Deputy Associate Administrator for the Office of Response and Recovery and the 
Regional Administrator for FEMA Region III agree to take the course of action 
recommended, as they were tasked by the Deputy Administrator to recommend a course 
of action. As the FEMA Region III Administrator is represented on the FEMA/USACE 
generator working group that is identified as responsible for informing the proposed 
courses of action, it is expected that the FEMA Region III Administrator will accept the 
proposed report and information campaign. 
The USACE Director of Contingency Operations and Homeland Security stated 
that USACE will welcome FEMA’s support for the EPFAT program at the 2014 USACE 
SLS. A formal memorandum sent from the FEMA Associate Administrator and the 
USACE Director to the regional leadership in both agencies can provide the regions with 
instruction and guidance on how to conduct the information campaign, and ensure that 
both FEMA and USACE regional leadership understand that this initiative is a priority of 
their leadership at headquarters. 
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State and local emergency management officials are anticipated to understand that 
promoting the EPFAT program can benefit their constituents. As FEMA regions 
regularly interface with these officials, the system to approach these officials is already in 
place and their support in promoting the EPFAT can be requested at regularly occurring 
meetings between FEMA regions and these officials. As the state and local officials have 
regularly occurring meetings with the owners and operators of critical facilities within 
their jurisdictions, promoting the EPFAT should not require much effort on their behalf. 
As mentioned in the policy analysis section, the owners and operators of critical 
facilities are likely to understand the benefit of providing the generator requirements for 
their critical facilities through EPFAT. However, it is anticipated that they will first ask if 
the federal government can provide funding for the assessments, as is done through 
Mission Assignments that provide disaster funding for USACE to conduct assessments of 
critical facilities following Presidential declarations. However, these cannot be funded 
when there is no Presidential declaration. Additionally, while states are aware that 
USACE can conduct assessments during steady-state training exercises, USACE does not 
have the capacity to perform assessments of all critical facilities in the Nation through 
these exercises. However, USACE leadership mentioned at the 2014 USACE SLS that 
most if not all critical facilities have qualified building managers or electricians under 
contract that can be utilized to conduct the assessments of their generator requirements 
and share those requirements through EPFAT at little to no additional cost. To encourage 
critical facility owners and operators to assess and share their generator requirements, it is 
recommended that the information campaign address these anticipated concerns 
regarding the cost and ability to conduct assessments in the campaign’s messaging to 
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reassure critical facility owners and operators that it is in their best interest to assess their 
facilities’ generator requirements and provide that information through EPFAT. 
 
VII. RECOMMENDATION 
 It is recommended that FEMA produce a comprehensive report that assesses the 
generator program to identify the program’s mission requirements stated in law and 
through strategic and planning guidance, and based on historical analysis as well as future 
risk assessments. As FEMA leadership is seeking to gain efficiencies across the Agency, 
and particularly in the delivery of generators, the report will provide the necessary 
information and context for leadership to decide on the future direction of the program. 
Additionally, the critical facility generator requirements collected through EPFAT, as a 
result of the proposed information campaign, will not only inform the comprehensive 
report, but will also help expedite the installation of generators at critical facilities. This 
recommendation should be pursued at this time for the following reasons: 
Climate Change and Criticality of Power: Ensuring the resilience of critical 
facilities is vital as climate change assessments predict an increased frequency of severe 
weather that will further stress the aging energy infrastructure in the United States, and 
power disruption leads to cascading impacts on all sectors. Providing power to critical 
facilities when disasters cause significant disruption to the power grid ensures that critical 
facilities can service their community. As these critical facilities include medical, 
emergency management, and public works facilities, such as water and sewage treatment 
plants, providing power to critical facilities can help stabilize impacted communities and 
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provides communities with life sustaining services. The federal government will not have 
to provide these services if they can be provided by critical facilities. 
Existing Systems: As the recommendation does not require changes in 
authorization or additional appropriations, the comprehensive report analysis and the 
accompanying information campaign can begin immediately. Therefore, FEMA will be 
able to gain efficiencies while not expending additional resources.  
Disaster vs. Preparedness Funding: When power is compromised during a 
disaster, states may request support from the Federal government. FEMA  supports this 
need by mission assigning USACE to conduct assessments of critical facilities and by 
providing generators to those facilities. The use of mission assignments is not available 
during steady-state operations when there is no Presidential declaration, so it is possible 
that SLTT governments will not inherently distinguish the resources and capabilities 
provided by the federal government for preparedness from the resources and capabilities 
available when there is an active Presidential declaration. Recognizing this, the states and 
counties may believe the federal government should pay for assessments to obtain 
generator requirements for critical facilities in advance of a disaster. However, this 
concern can likely be resolved through clear messaging that distinguishes preparedness 
funding from disaster response funding, and by following the recommended actions 
presented above, such as explaining the benefits of expedited installation. 
Status Quo: While there has not been a failure in the ability of the federal 
government to provide generators to critical facilities impacted by disasters, the data 
shows that the program has acquired, stored, maintained, and deployed generators 
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without linking its efforts to accurate requirements, resulting in a 12 percent utilization 
rate of deployed generators. Therefore, FEMA can gain efficiencies in meeting its 
generator program by producing a comprehensive report that identifies more accurate 
requirements for the program. As these requirements will not be known until the findings 
of the report are released, FEMA cannot compare alternative means for delivering 
generator requirements without the requirements being identified. 
 FEMA Responds to Consequences: Additionally, while the federal government 
may be able to reduce the potential for power disruption by creating laws and regulations 
that address contributing factors to climate change or by incentivizing the hardening of 
critical infrastructure, FEMA is responsible for ensuring the federal government can 
support SLTT governments in responding to disasters. As new laws, regulations, or grant 
programs that may be able to help lower the risk for power disruption could take years to 
come into effect, if ever possible, and because the effects of any new laws, regulations, or 
grant programs would not be known for many years after being implemented, FEMA 
should pursue the recommended proposal as it addresses the consequences of the current 
system and factors future risk based on the current state of affairs. 
By producing the proposed comprehensive report and conducting the proposed 
information campaign, FEMA is more likely to ascertain any adjustments that may be 
required to better enable the federal government to provide power to critical facilities 
when impacted by disasters; and with this information, FEMA and USACE can expedite 
the time that it takes to provide backup power to critical facilities when disasters strike. 
Therefore, the recommendations will significantly improve the time that it takes 
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